We examined how the distribution of information among team members and accountability pressures affected the quality of negotiated settlements reached among teams of friends negotiating against teams of strangers. The main conclusions of the experiment may be summarized by the following findings: (1) Teams of strangers reaped a greater share of the joint profit than did teams of friends when teammates were accountable to a supervisor as opposed to negotiating strictly on their own behalf. (2) Teams of strangers also reaped a marginally greater share of the joint profit than did teams of friends when teammates possessed unique, as opposed to common, information about their own team's preferences. (3) Not surprisingly, teams of friends were more cohesive than were teams of strangers; however, teams of friends were also more concerned about maintaining their relationship than were teams of strangers. (4) Teams of friends felt least cohesive when they were accountable to a supervisor, whereas teams of strangers felt most cohesive when they were accountable. Similarly, friends indicated greater relationship concerns when having to deal with distributed information,
whereas information distribution had no effect on the relationship concerns of strangers. (5) For teams of strangers, greater team cohesiveness was positively correlated with better performance. (6) Moreover, when teams of strangers felt more cohesive than their opponents, they earned more than teams of strangers who felt less cohesive. ᭧ 1997 Academic Press A large body of research spanning several disciplines has considered how teams of people coordinate their behavior to achieve shared goals (Guzzo & Salas, 1995; Hackman, 1990; Mohrman, Cohen, & Mohrman, 1995) . However, the question of how teams coordinate their behavior in competitive situations has not constituted a major research question. Consider the following situations:
• A couple negotiating with a sales manager at a car dealership for a price on a new car
• A group of managers from a small software company negotiating the sale of one of their product lines to the largest software company in the world
• A group of employees negotiating with their management about company policies and working conditions
In each of these situations, teams of people must coordinate their efforts to achieve shared goals. If the couple buys the car at a good price, the small software company makes a large profit, and the employees achieve favorable working conditions, team effort is successful. Perhaps a more fundamental question concerns the efficacy of teams at the bargaining table. When at least one of the parties at the negotiation table is represented by a team, the joint profitability of all parties is greater than when both parties are single negotiators (Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996) . What about when teams of negotiators bargain against other teams ? Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt (1996) addressed this precise question by pitting teams of friends against teams of unacquainted persons, teams of friends against other teams of friends, and teams of unacquainted persons against teams of unacquainted persons (Experiment 2; this question was part of a more complex design).
The unexpected finding was that teams of nonfriends negotiating against teams of nonfriends reached more mutually beneficial outcomes than did teams of friends negotiating against teams of friends. However, when teams of nonfriends were seated across the table from teams of friends, there was no measurable difference between the two teams in terms of their ultimate profits. Thus, teams of strangers seem more skilled at enlarging the pie of resources compared to teams of friends, but do not necessarily claim more of the resources when negotiating against teams of friends. Both of these findings seem to fly in the face of intuition and logic. That is, it would seem that teams of friends should be uniquely skilled at maximizing the pie of resources to be divided and claiming a greater share of resources than teams of unacquainted persons. So, why does this intuition fail to hold up, and are there conditions under which teams of friends might be expected to do particularly well (or poorly) when seated at the bargaining table across from strangers? It is precisely this question that we address in this study.
The traditional view is that effective teamwork is determined by the relationship that team members have with each other (Likert, 1961; Blake & Mouton, 1964; Argyris, 1964; McGregor, 1960) . A large literature suggests that to the extent that groups and teams are cohesive or attracted to their group, performance improves (for a review, see Evans & Dion, 1991) . In the Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt (1996) investigation, cohesion was positively associated with profitability. Thus, the teams of friends would appear to have every advantage-greater cohesion, an established communication system, trust in their teammates, and so on-to reap greater profits at the bargaining table. Yet, they do not. Our thesis is that teams of friends may falter, despite their greater cohesiveness and communication system, when negotiating against a team of nonacquainted persons. Below, we consider some of the team dynamics that we believe explain why this can happen and when we can expect teams of friends to excel at negotiations. Thus, our focus is both descriptive and prescriptive.
Shared Understanding within Teams
One feature of close relationships is the development of transactive memory structures that allow the members of groups and teams to process information together efficiently (Wegner, 1986) . Transactive memory is a shared system for encoding, storing, and retrieving information; individuals linked in such a system are aware of the general content of each other's memories, and thus can draw upon the knowledge held by other members as needed. They will also be aware of what pieces of information each member is likely to focus on when the group encounters new information. Such a system is built over time by people in relationships, and involves the operation of the memory systems of individuals and the process of communication that occurs within a group. The most intricate and accurate transactive memories are formed by people who are intimate, which allows a large degree of cognitive dependence, such that thought processes and structures are mutually determined (Wegner, Erber, & Raymond, 1991) . Thus, we expect that people who are highly acquainted should view situations in similar ways as a function of their transactive memory network.
A related concept is the shared mental model or the team mental model (for a review, see Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) . A team mental model is a shared representation of the team, its task, and its environment. Team mental models allow strategists, such as negotiators, to interpret their competitive environments (Porac & Thomas, 1990) and to develop shared explanations for past events and shared expectations for the future. Team members who are acquainted have had opportunities to develop a transactive memory structure or shared mental model through the course of their previous interactions; team members whose previous task experience has been outside the context of their current team may possess many task-relevant knowledge structures, but those structures are not transactive nor are they necessarily shared, and such teams may not perform as well as teams with shared experience.
For example, Liang, Moreland, and Argote (1995) trained groups of people in the steps involved in assembling a radio. A week later, groups actually assembled the radio. Some people assembled the radio in the same groups they belonged to when they were given the initial instructions; others assembled the radio in groups that they did not meet during the initial instruction phase. In both cases, training and preparation was identical. However, the groups who were acquainted performed better at the task, presumably because the initial training session allowed them to develop a shared understanding of their task and of each other that was not available for the groups who interacted for the first time while assembling the radio.
On the basis of these findings, it would seem that team members who are acquainted should perform better in negotiation than people who are not acquainted. However, as we have noted, this is not the case. Why might this be? According to Wegner (1986) , if transactive memory structures in established groups are disrupted, blocked, or otherwise prevented from being operated on (e.g., a group member leaves the group), group performance may suffer. As an illustration, Wegner et al. (1991) examined memory performance in couples and unacquainted dyads. Real couples performed better than ad hoc couples in a recall task that paired category labels with related phrases. In contrast, pairs of strangers performed better when they were given specific encoding instructions. It was reasoned that real couples' transactive memory system assisted them in allocating responsibility for the items to be recalled, but when a recall structure was imposed on the couples (e.g., one person was instructed to remember food items; another history items, etc.), it disrupted the intact systems. Thus, constraints appear to be helpful for teams who do not have a previously developed system for coordinating activity, but may interfere with the preexisting transactive memory structure of intact groups. Below, we consider two key mechanisms that may influence transactive memory structures among negotiations teams: information distribution and accountability pressures.
Information Distribution within Negotiation Teams
Effective negotiation involves several skills, the most important of which include the accurate assessment of one's priorities and preferences concerning the negotiation issues, an accurate understanding of the priorities and preferences of the other party, and the development and implementation of strategies to achieve one's objectives. Members of a negotiation team may naturally have different knowledge, information, and expertise. If team members work together over time, they can discover these areas of specialization and learn to take advantage of them. However, circumstances may sometimes dictate that individual team members be responsible for pieces of information that would not typically be theirs to deal with under the team's preexisting information processing system. In these situations, information is distributed rather than commonly shared among team members. Consider, on the other hand, a case in which all members of a team hold all relevant information-that is, team members are perfectly redundant. Contrast that to a situation in which information is distributed in terms of functional silos. We expect that teams of friends should perform better when they possess common information rather than when information is in separate banks, because they can process information according to their own previously established system. Teams of strangers, on the other hand, may benefit from the structured division of responsibility encouraged by distributed information.
Team Accountability
Negotiators do not always negotiate on their own behalf; in many situations, they are accountable to a constituency, supervisor, or organization (Tetlock, 1985; 1992) . Accountability pressures lead negotiators to bargain more firmly and in a more risky fashion than when they are not under pressure from a constituency (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Seilhemier, 1981) . Negotiators who are accountable to a constituency for attaining a particular outcome are less likely to make concessions, more likely to make demands, and more likely to hold out for particular terms than are negotiators who are not accountable (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979) .
A negotiator may be accountable to a constituency who expects the negotiator to reap the greatest possible gains for the members of the constituency. However, there are different kinds of accountability other than profit maximization that may have a profound effect on negotiator behavior. For example, some negotiators may be accountable for fostering and maintaining positive relationships with others. Consider the case of a manager who was hired to negotiate contracts for her company. Intent upon maximizing the bottom-line profitability of the company, she unwittingly antagonized the company's main customer: the United Parcel Service. She was asked to leave the company by her supervisor, who told her strictly, "Our relationship with the customer comes first."
Our thesis is that constraints and explicit goals are conducive to performance among nonfriends but problematic when implemented by friends. Therefore, we hypothesize that strangers will be most effective in a profit-accountability environment, next most effective in a people-accountability environment, and least effective when not accountable. Although both types of accountability provide some structure, the task of maintaining harmonious relationships is more vague and more behaviorally complex; we expect that meeting the demands of people-accountability will not be as easy for strangers as the demands of profit-accountability. In contrast, we expect the opposite to be true for friends; they should function best with no accountability, but if accountability is imposed, people-oriented goals should not be more difficult than profit-oriented goals.
Thus far, we have argued that informational constraints (distributed as opposed to shared information within a team) and external pressures (accountability) plague the effectiveness of teams whose members are well acquainted by interfering with the natural systems these people have developed for dealing with problems. In contrast, we have argued that the very same factors operate as useful organizational tools within teams whose members are not familiar. If this is true, we should not only see evidence of disruption (in the case of friends) and facilitation (in the case of strangers) in performance on objective measures, but we should also find that intrateam relationships are affected by these factors as well.
The two relationship variables that we focus on are cohesion and relationship concerns. Cohesion can be defined in many different ways, and as in previous team negotiation research , we are using a task-focused definition of cohesion (Mullen & Copper, 1994) : we are interested in the extent to which team members trust each other's skills and perceive that they are working interdependently toward a common goal. We expect that the imposition of distributed information and outside accountability will shake the cohesion of teams of friends by causing them to question each other's skills under these unfamiliar circumstances; whereas it will enhance the cohesion of teams of strangers, by providing them with clearer expectations, the foundations for trust. By relationship concerns, we mean team members' concerns about their partner's perception of them and concerns about maintaining the quality of their relationship. An analysis of teamwork stress (Morgan & Bowers, 1995) suggests that both external conditions (such as workload and time pressure) and internal conditions (such as role conflict) can put pressure on team members' ability to work effectively with each other. Such pressures can change members' approach to their team, including increasing some teamwork behaviors and decreasing others, and changing team patterns of communication (Morgan & Bowers, 1995) . In investigating relationship concerns in this study, we are looking at a specific subset of teamwork stress: increased concern regarding the partner relationship is one possible indicator that the negotiation conditions are causing teamwork stress. We expect that the unfamiliar strictures of distributed information and outside accountability will be more stressful for teams of friends, whereas the ambiguity that results in the absence of these conditions will be more stressful for teams of strangers.
Hypotheses
The purpose of the study is to examine negotiations between teams of friends versus teams of people who are not acquainted as a function of information distribution among team members and accountability pressures. In each negotiation, a team of friends negotiates against a team of strangers. (We did not include a friend vs friend nor stranger vs stranger condition, as this comparison has been previously examined by Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt (1996) . Furthermore, our focus was on the distribution of resources between teams-which would not be meaningful when teams were structurally identical, as in the friends-friends and strangers-strangers case.) Some of the teams are "informational clones" such that teammates share identical information concerning the negotiation situation. In contrast, for other teams, the information is distributed among teammates: each member has only partial information about their team's interests. Some teams were accountable to a supervisor; others were not. Some supervisors valued only profit maximization, whereas others valued both profit and the maintenance of cordial relationships.
Our hypotheses are the following: (H1) Teams of friends should negotiate more effectively (i.e., reap a larger share of the joint resources) when information is shared, as this allows them to process information according to their own system than when information is distributed. (H2) Teams of strangers, on the other hand, should benefit from a structured division of responsibility that comes from distributed information. (H3) Teams of friends should perform better when they are not accountable to a supervisor; (H4) in contrast, teams of strangers should perform better when under accountability pressure. (H5) Teams of strangers should perform better when under profit-rather than people-accountability. In summary, teams of friends are expected to outperform their opponents (teams of strangers) under conditions of shared information and no accountability (Hypotheses 1 and 3). In contrast, teams of strangers are expected to outperform teams of friends when they are informationally dependent and under accountability pressure, particularly profit goals (Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5). We further expect that objective measures of performance will be corroborated by psychological measures of team cohesion and relationship concerns.
METHOD

Participants
A total of 240 people participated in the study; half were undergraduate students who participated for extra credit in their introductory psychology course and the other half were their friends, who accompanied them to the experiment. Participants and their friends were recruited in the same manner as that used by Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt (1996) and Thompson & DeHarpport (in press ). In the procedure, each student who signed up for the experiment was required to bring a friend whom he or she had known for at least three months and saw at least once a week outside of class. Students who signed up were given a screening questionnaire to determine their suitability for the study (cf. Fry, Firestone, & Williams, 1983) . The screening questionnaire asked students how long they had known their friend and how often they saw their friend. Those who did not meet the screening criteria specified above were thanked and not scheduled. In the sample, 54% of the friends reported knowing each other for 7-12 months, with 23% longer and 23% shorter. 69% saw each other every day, with 15% seeing each other 4-6 days a week, and 15% less often. 85% described their relationship as "friend"; with the other choices being "relatives," "dating," and "married." Those meeting the screening criteria, were randomly assigned to one experimental condition (described below). The final sample included 120 two-person negotiation teams, resulting in 60 individual negotiations.
Experimental Design
The experiment used a 2x3x2 design with two independent variables, "Information Distribution" and "Accountability" that varied between negotiations, and one independent variable, "Intrateam Relationship" (friends or strangers) that varied within each negotiation. Ten groups of four were assigned to each condition. There were two types of Information Distribution: "Distributed," in which teammates held partial, overlapping information about team interests, and "Shared," in which both team members held identical information about the team's interests. There were three types of Accountability: "People Accountability," in which the team was accountable to a supervisor who was concerned about relationships as well as monetary outcomes; "Profit Accountability," in which the team was accountable to a supervisor who was concerned only about monetary outcomes; and a "No Supervisor" condition in which teams were told to maximize profit for their own gain. Specifically, participants in the People accountability condition were told that their supervisor was a very "peopleoriented" person: demanding fairness and politeness from every area of the corporation, stressing that profit is not the only consideration in the negotiation, and believing that building a friendly relationship and maintaining coordination are also important, even if they do not directly improve profit. Participants in the Profit accountability condition were told that their supervisor was a very "bottom-line"oriented person: demanding efficiency and profit from every area of the corporation, stressing that profit is the only consideration in the negotiation, and believing that building a relationship and maintaining coordination is viewed as a waste of time, unless it directly improves profits. In our analyses, we focus on two key comparisons: (1) the presence of accountability (accountability to supervisor or not) and (2) type of accountability (People vs Profit supervisor).
Materials and Procedure
Negotiation task. Participants engaged in a two-party, multi-issue negotiation about a real estate development project (an adaptation of the "Pelican Landing" case developed by Susan Brodt). In the task, representatives of the development company and members of the city planning council negotiated terms on eight issues, including the selection of a building inspector and the ratio of condominiums to apartments in the development.
In the negotiation, each person in the four-member group was given specific information about the issues to be negotiated, the possible settlement alternatives, and the payoffs for various alternatives. Negotiators had identical preferences for two of the issues (building inspector and retail space, see Appendix 2). However, because negotiators saw only their own profit schedules, compatible interests on these issues were not at all immediately apparent. Four of the issues (condominium/apartment ratio, city financing, percentage of low-income units, and number of local subcontractors) were constructed so that one team cared much more about a particular issue than the other team, and vice versa for other issues. Specifically, condo/apartment ratio and city financing were more important to the developers, whereas low income and local subcontractors were more important to the city. Finally, two issues (open space and building height) defined completely conflicting, or purely distributive, interests. That is, one party's gain resulted in an equal loss for the other party.
In the Shared information condition, teammates received identical, complete information about their party's interests which listed their payoffs for each of the five options of the eight issues. In the Distributed information condition, the payoff schedules given to each member of the team made it necessary for members to pool information to fully understand where their interests lay. The payoff charts given to team members are presented in Appendix 2. Specifically, in the Distributed condition: (1) Both teammates received full information about both distributive issues; (2) The logrolling issues were split between the team members-one person received complete information about the two issues that were more important to their party, the other received complete information about the two less important issues, and both teammates were notified that their partner had important information about the other two issues; (3) Each team member received partial information about the two compatible issues; that is, for each issue, one team member received payoff information about options 1, 2, and 3, the other received payoff information about options 3, 4, and 5, and both were advised to discuss the issues with their partner (see Appendix 2).
For participants in the People and Profit accountability conditions, the task included information about their supervisor (for the team of developers, the supervisor was the president of their company; for the city planners, the supervisor was their mayor). A vignette described the supervisor's actions and opinions in a situation which pitted maximizing company profit against building good relationships. In the People condition, the supervisor was described as valuing cordial, considerate business relationships, as well as profit; in the Profit condition, the supervisor valued profit and dismissed concerns about people. In the control condition, no mention was made of a supervisor; rather, teams were told to maximize their profits.
Procedure. Eight participants (four pairs of friends) reported to each experimental session. Two pairs were randomly selected to be split and rearranged, yielding two pairs of strangers. Each observation consisted of a pair of strangers negotiating against a pair of friends. Both teams in a negotiation were randomly assigned to the same Information Distribution and to an Accountability condition. Upon giving their informed consent, participants were randomly assigned a role and background information and were informed who their partner would be and with whom they would negotiate. The background material contained the task information described above as well as information about a drawing for $100 to be held at the end of the term. It was explained that participants as well as their friends were eligible for the lottery prize. Informal pretesting indicated that this level of monetary incentive was extremely enticing, as no other opportunity existed for participants to be paid during this time period. Participants were told that their profit would determine the number of lottery entries they received and their chance of winning the lottery; they were also told that, should their team win, each team member would receive $50. There were no other direct rewards and incentives for the parties. The lottery was real and two pairs (one playing each role in a negotiation) were awarded. The award was made public by posting the names of the winners on a list outside the lab door. In addition, participants in the People and Profit accountability conditions were informed that a supervisor would evaluate their behavior and could as much as double their lottery entries if their team met the supervisor's expectations as set forth in the background reading. All participants were cautioned not to physically show their materials to anyone, including their partner.
Participants had 10 min to read the material, after which time each team met in a separate room, equipped with a table, four chairs, a microphone, and a video camera, to prepare for 10 min. The experimenter showed participants a control room containing the video monitors; participants were told their interactions would be monitored. In the People and Profit accountability conditions, participants were introduced to the supervisor, who was stationed in the control room. The supervisor was dressed in business attire and held a clipboard with rating forms. Two assistants, both female, portrayed the supervisor; both assistants participated in all conditions.
Following the preparation session, teams negotiated for a maximum of 30 min in a face-to-face, unconstrained fashion. The only restriction placed on the negotiators was that they could not physically exchange written materials; they were free to say anything. After the negotiation, parties were asked to write the agreement (if any) that was reached, and all parties indicated their acceptance by signing the agreement. Participants completed questionnaires before and then immediately following the negotiation, assessing cohesion, relationship concerns, and attitudes toward the opposing team. Statements also assessed willingness to disagree with one's partner. These items did not form a reliable scale and showed no effects of any of the independent variables, so they will not be discussed further. Also, participants in one negotiation did not complete the questionnaires properly.
Dependent Measures
There were four key dependent measures: performance on the task, team cohesion, relationship concerns, and attitudes toward the opposing team.
Performance. The performance measure of relative profit compared the amount earned by the team of friends to the amount earned by the team of strangers within each negotiation. Relative profit was further broken down into relative profit on logrolling issues and relative profit on purely distributive issues.
Team cohesiveness. Both before and after negotiation, we assessed cohesion between partners, using a scale developed by Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt (1996) . Participants indicated their agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by choosing a number from a 1-11 scale: "I trust my partner's bargaining skills," "My partner and I will work together as a cohesive team," and "I will understand what my partner is doing and why." After negotiation, these statements were phrased in the past tense, along with two additional statements: "My partner and I communicated well" and "My partner and I shared our ideas and concerns."
Relationship concerns. We examined team members' concerns about their partner's evaluation of them. ("I care about my partner's opinion of me," "It is important to me to get along well with my partner during this negotiation," and "I will pay attention to what my partner is thinking and feeling." For the postnegotiation measure, the first and third statements were phrased in the past tense, and the second statement was omitted.)
Attitude toward the opposing team. Because some of our key hypotheses concerned negotiators' ability to maximize profit, we assessed negotiators' willingness to contend with the other party ("I will stand up for what my team wants in this negotiation," "I will focus on how to earn more profit," and "I will argue with our opponents if necessary." These statements were phrased in the past tense after negotiation.)
RESULTS
Information Distribution
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicted that teams of friends should earn greater profits when information was shared, rather than distributed, among team members. Conversely, teams of strangers were expected to earn more when information was distributed rather than shared. As predicted, relative profit was skewed toward teams of Strangers in the Distributed information condition ( M diff = Ϫ862, SD = 2,968), where negative numbers indicate an advantage for the Strangers, as compared to the Shared information condition (M = 329, SD = 2,687), but this difference was not significant ( F[1, 54] = 2.56, p = .11).
Two categories of issues contributed to differences in profit between teams of friends and teams of strangers: the two purely distributive issues and the four logrolling issues. Recall that regardless of Information Distribution condition, all participants received complete information about the distributive issues, whereas the presentation of the logrolling issues differed by condition. Thus, relative profits were examined separately for each type of issue. For the logrolling issues, there was a marginal effect for Information Distribution ( F[1, 54] = 3.18, p Ͻ .09). In the Distributed information condition, teams of strangers earned marginally more than teams of friends (M = Ϫ655, SD = 1,951; F[1, 29] = 3.28, p Ͻ .09), while in the Shared information condition there was no significant difference in profit between teams of friends and strangers ( M = 193, SD = 1,661; F Ͻ 1). As for relative profits on purely distributive issues, neither teams of friends nor strangers had a significant advantage in any conditions ( Fs Ͻ 1), nor did Accountability or Information Distribution significantly affect relative profit ( Fs Ͻ 1).
Accountability
Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that teams of friends should perform better when not under accountability pressure; in contrast, teams of strangers should perform better when accountable to a supervisor, particularly one who values profit (Hypothesis 5). Again, because two categories of issues contributed to differences in profit, relative profits were examined for logrolling and distributive issues. For logrolling issues, there was a marginal effect for Accountability ( F[2, 54] Prior to negotiation, there was more dependence within teams of friends than within teams of strangers. Specifically, among friends, team membership accounted for 67% of the total variance in cohesiveness, 76% of the variance in concerns about one's teammate, and 64% of the variance in attitudes toward the opposing team. Among strangers, the variance accounted for by team membership was lower: 57%, 64%, and 59%, respectively, for the three measures. After negotiation, however, results were mixed. For both cohesiveness and concern about one's teammate, team membership accounted for more variance among strangers (71% and 64%, respectively) than among friends (66% and 61%, respectively), whereas for attitude toward the opposing team, team membership accounted for more variance among friends (65%) than among strangers (57%).
Interteam relationships. Whereas teams seated across from one another at the bargaining table could be dependent on each other in the same fashion as those on the same side of the bargaining table, intraclass correlations indicated that opposing teams' answers were not significantly related to each other (for example, prenegotiation cohesion: FϽ1), with the exception of attitudes toward the opposing team (F[58,59] = 1.81, pϽ.05), as measured prior to negotiation. Consequently, for this measure, the scores of all participants in the negotiation were averaged.
Intrateam cohesion. As might be expected, before negotiation, teams of friends felt more cohesive (M = 9.55, SD = 1.29) than did teams of strangers ( M = 8.84, SD = 1.21; F[1, 53] = 9.59, p Ͻ .005). The same was found after negotiation (friends: M = 9.26, SD = 1.40; strangers: M = 8.71, SD = 1.74; F[1, 53] = 4.27, p Ͻ .05). There was a significant interaction between Intrateam Relationship and Accountability (F[2, 53] = 5.23, p Ͻ .01). As predicted, teams of friends felt most cohesive when they were not accountable to a supervisor (M = 10.05, SD = 0.81), as compared to when they were accountable to a People (M = 9.18, SD = 1.48) or Profit (M = 9.38, SD = 1.39) supervisor (F[1, 53] = 4.88, p Ͻ .05; means and significance tests for prenegotiation measure). Teams of strangers, on the other hand, felt least cohesive when they had no supervisor (M = 8.41, SD = 1.27), as compared to when they were accountable to a People (M = 9.18, SD = 1.14) or Profit (M = 9.00, SD = 1.14) supervisor (F[1, 53] = 4.06 p Ͻ .05, see Fig. 2 ). These results corroborate the performance measures and thus provide a possible process mechanism.
Relationship concerns. Before negotiation, teams of friends reported that they were more concerned about their partner's feelings and opinions (M = 9.06, SD = 1.65) than were teams of strangers (M = 8.37, SD = 1.56; F[1, 53] = 9.83, p Ͻ .005). The same was true after negotiation (friends: M= 9.07, SD = 1.76; strangers: M = 8.51, SD = 1.73; F[1, 53] = 5.66, p Ͻ .05). As predicted, friends were more concerned about their partner when their preferences were Attitude toward the opposing team. Prior to negotiation, there was a significant effect of Accountability on negotiators' willingness to contend with their opponents (F[2, 51] = 10.65, p Ͻ .001). As expected, participants accountable to a Profit supervisor were most willing to contend with their opponents (M = 10.17, SD = 0.51), as compared to teams not accountable to a supervisor (M = 9.56, SD = 0.79) and teams accountable to a People supervisor (M = 8.87, SD = 1.03; teams accountable to a People supervisor differ from the other two conditions via a Tukey HSD range test, p Ͻ .05). After negotiation, there was still an effect of Accountability (F[2, 53] = 3.28, p Ͻ .05): Teams accountable to a Profit supervisor were the most willing to contend with their opponents (M = 9.76, SD = 0.71), followed by teams accountable to a People supervisor (M = 9.21, SD = 0.99), followed by teams not accountable to a supervisor (M = 9.06, SD = 0.91; Profit and No Accountability conditions differ by a Tukey HSD range test, p Ͻ .05). Intraparty Relationship and Information Distribution did not significantly affect teams' willingness to contend, either before or after negotiation, nor did these factors interact with Accountability (Fs Ͻ 1).
Summary of process measures. For teams of friends, all three variables were significantly correlated with each other. That is, teams who were more cohesive also reported more concern about their teammates (r = .53, p Ͻ .01) and more contentious attitudes about the opposing team (r = .62, p Ͻ .01), and teams who had more contentious attitudes about the opposing team also experienced greater concern about their teammate (r = .40, p Ͻ .01). For teams of strangers, however, cohesiveness was positively correlated with concern about the teammate (r = .38, p Ͻ .01) and contentious attitudes toward the opposing team (r = .37, p Ͻ.01), but contentiousness was not correlated with concern about one's teammate (r = .08, n.s.) For teams of strangers, team cohesiveness was correlated with logrolling profit (r = .26, p Ͻ .05). Also, the greater the positive difference between teams of friends' and teams of strangers' cohesiveness, the less the teams of strangers earned (r ϭ .27 p Ͻ .05). That is, teams of strangers who were less cohesive than their opponents earned less than did teams of strangers who were more cohesive than their opponents. The cohesiveness of friends was not related to their logrolling profit (r ϭ .03, n.s.), nor was the cohesiveness of their stranger opponents related to the friends' logrolling profit (r = .03, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the experiment was to examine how the distribution of information among team members and accountability pressures affect the allocation of resources when teams of friends negotiate with teams of strangers. The main conclusions of the experiment may be summarized by the following findings: (1) When teams of friends negotiated against teams of strangers, the balance of profit tended to shift toward the teams of strangers when information was distributed, as opposed to shared, among teammates (supporting hypotheses 1 and 2). (2) The balance of profits shifted toward teams of strangers when teammates were accountable to a supervisor, as opposed to negotiating on their own behalf (supporting hypothesis 4). (3) Not surprisingly, teams of friends were more cohesive at the bargaining table than teams of strangers; however, teams of friends also experienced more concern about their teammates than did teams of strangers. (4) Teams of friends felt least cohesive when they were accountable to a supervisor, whereas teams of strangers felt most cohesive when they were accountable. Similarly, friends indicated greater relationship concerns when having to deal with distributed information, whereas information distribution had no effect on the relationship concerns of strangers. (5) Among teams of strangers, negotiation performance was positively correlated with greater intrateam cohesiveness. (6) Also, when teams of strangers felt more cohesive than their opponents, they earned more than did teams of strangers who felt less cohesive than their opponents.
These findings are surprising in the sense that teams of friends would seem to have a natural advantage at the bargaining table. However, in no circumstance did teams of friends earn a significantly greater share of the negotiation profits than did the teams of strangers. This finding is consistent with previous research (see Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996) . We hypothesized that teams of friends would be more likely to negotiate effectively when teammates shared information and when they were not under accountability pressures. Our reasoning was that the teams of friends have well-developed shared cognitive systems for attending to, encoding, retrieving, and processing information. Such social-cognitive structures have been called transactive memory systems (Wegner, 1986) and team mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) . These structures are formed implicitly and enhance the processing of information relevant to dyads and groups. We reasoned, based on Wegner, Erber, & Raymond's (1991) analysis of transactive memory structure in couples, that when teams of negotiators were well acquainted and had an external constraint imposed on them, such as noncommon information suggesting clear division of labor, that this would hinder their ability to negotiate effectively. In contrast, external constraints should provide a useful organizing structure for teams of persons who do not know one another and are faced with the task of negotiating their working relationship. As predicted, teams of strangers outperformed teams of friends when teammates possessed noncommon information that encouraged division of labor and when teammates were under the supervision of a manager who imposed specific task demands. However, the effect was not overwhelming.
Whereas our theoretical interpretation posits the existence of transactive memory structures and shared mental models held by teams of friends, we did not attempt to measure these directly. This of course suggests that any number of factors, other than the operation of and the disruption of shared mental models, could have produced the findings. As a way of partially addressing this issue, we examined the degree of dependence among teammates' responses and found that teammates' perceptions were not independent of one another; intraclass correlations indicated that for variables such as cohesion and relationship concerns, there was more variance between teams than there was within teams. Further, we found that dependence was an intrateam dynamicnot an interteam dynamic, as perceptions held by teams across the bargaining table were not correlated (with the exception of negotiators' attitudes toward the opposing team, which essentially served as a manipulation check of the accountability manipulation). Most notably, prior to negotiation, dependence among teams of friends was greater than that among teams of nonfriends, suggesting that they shared a mental model of the situation.
We examined three factors that may underlie some of the team dynamics that influence negotiator effectiveness: team cohesiveness, relationship concerns, and attitudes toward the opposing team. On the basis of previous research and theory documenting the positive relationship between group cohesiveness and performance (see Evans & Dion, 1991 , for a review), we predicted that team cohesiveness would be positively related to performance. We found that, for teams composed of strangers, those with greater cohesiveness performed better than teams who were less cohesive. And, not surprisingly, teams of friends were more cohesive, both before and following the negotiation than were teams of strangers. (The lack of a correlation between cohesiveness and performance for friends may be due in part to a restriction of range; there were not many teams of friends with low cohesiveness.)
These findings raise the following question: Why did the teams of friends not perform better than teams of strangers if they were more cohesive and cohesiveness is positively related to performance? We reasoned that a countervailing force operates within teams that is negatively associated with performance. We called this factor "relationship concerns" and described it as the concerns held by persons who are in long-term relationships about the well being of the other party and their relationship. We reasoned that such concerns hinder negotiators' ability to think creatively, problem-solve, and freely explore alternatives. Indeed, teams of friends reported greater concerns about their relationship than did teams of strangers. Furthermore, teams of friends reported the highest levels of concern when information was distributed-the situation in which they fared the least well at the bargaining table. Further, cohesion and relationship concerns were correlated: the more cohesive teams were, the more concern they experienced about their teammate.
We examined a third factor that we thought might influence negotiator effectiveness: negotiators' attitudes toward the opposing team. Willingness to defend one's own interests and challenge the positions held by opponents is a key skill for distributive negotiation. There were no reported differences between attitudes toward the opposing team among teams of friends and teams of strangers. However, friends who reported greater willingness to contend with their opponents also reported greater concern about their teammate, whereas willingness to contend was not associated with concerns about one's teammate among strangers.
The findings clearly suggest that teams of friends seldom are at an advantage at the bargaining table against a team of strangers. Teams of friends are more cohesive than teams of strangers, but they also experience more concern about their teammate. Two other factors appear to work against teams of friends at the bargaining table: distributed information and accountability pressure.
If we take these findings to heart, the prescriptive implication would be that spouses should take a stranger (rather than their partner) to the car dealership and that long-time friends should avoid joint ventures together. However, these conclusions are impractical, and inconsistent with intuition and experience. Below, we consider the limitations of our study.
The most obvious shortcomings of our study are that the participants were college students with little experience in high-stakes negotiations, the monetary incentives were not tremendous, and the teams of friends differed in many ways from the nonfriend teams. Whereas it is true that the participants were inexperienced, investigations of negotiation performance in similar tasks have not found differences in participant populations, at least in terms of ability to identify compatible issues (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996) . The monetary incentives we included were, in fact, enticing to our undergraduate population. But more persuasively, there do not appear to be significant differences in performance in negotiation tasks as a function of monetary incentives (see Thompson & Hrebec, 1996) . We chose to examine intact friendship pairs in our study, which opens the door to a myriad of confounds between teams of friends and teams of strangers. Teams of friends not only are more cohesive and have similar mental models as compared to teams of strangers; the intrateam structure among friends may have been different due to the fact that one friend brought the other to the study. We cannot rule out these possibilities in the present study. Our purpose was to demonstrate a phenomenon before moving to the task of isolating the mechanism that produces it. Another concern is that the intact teams had little or no experience in negotiation situations like the one used in the study. In contrast, work teams in organizations develop their relationships over time in the context of teamwork. To the extent that the intact teams had repeated experience working with one another, they might very well perform better than teams of unacquainted persons.
At this point, we have raised many concerns with the design and methods of our study that render the interpretation of the findings less conclusive or generalizable than desirable. The study of team negotiation is a new area of research that has important consequences for the effective functioning of groups and organizations. There are many contexts where teams of well-acquainted persons negotiate against teams of newly acquainted individuals. By gaining an understanding of the dynamics that operate in negotiating teams, suggestions for improving performance and overcoming likely obstacles become more likely. Note. N size is based on four-person groups (40 people per cell).
